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Abstract 
Using a unique database of individual data and industry-level tariff rates and other industry 
characteristics,  this  paper  examines  the  link  between  trade  protection  and  inter-industry 
wage premia in India during a period of rapid trade liberalisation. These premia represent 
differentials solely due to the industry affiliation of the worker after controlling for other 
worker characteristics. This paper finds that the impact of protection on the inter-industry 
wage  premia  is  substantially  positive  -  workers  employed  in  industries  with  high  tariffs 
receive higher wages than apparently identical workers in low tariff industries. This positive 
tariff-wage  effect  is  evident  whether  or  not  industry  specific  effects  are  included  and  is 
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The 1990s was a period of rapid trade liberalisation and industrial deregulation in 
India. Despite considerable debate regarding these reforms little systematic empirical 
work has been undertaken on the effects of such liberalisation on wages in India. This 
paper attempts to fill this gap through an econometric examination of the link between 
trade liberalisation and inter-industry wage premia.  
 
Most empirical work examining the link between trade and wages has focussed on the 
impact of trade liberalisation on the skill premia within the context of the Hecksher-
Ohlin  framework.  Attanasio  et  al.(2004)  argue  that  in  developing  countries  where 
labour market rigidities prevent labour reallocation across sectors in response to trade 
liberalisation and where markets have been recently liberalised, short- and medium-
run trade models and trade models with imperfect competition that allow for sector-
specific  returns  to  factors  are  more  appropriate.  Empirical  evidence  suggests  that 
workers’ industry affiliation is an important determinant of the wage, either in the 
form of returns to industry-specific skills that cannot be transferred in the short- to 
medium-run or as industry rents arising out of imperfect competition (Krueger and 
Summers, 1988). There is some evidence of rigidities in the Indian labour market 
implying that an industry based approach is appropriate (Tendulkar, 1998). 
 
This paper examines whether the impact of India' s tariff reductions during the 1990s 
conform to the predictions of the Ricardo-Viner trade model and the other channels 
through which trade affects relative wages. The next section describes the analytical 
framework underlying this analysis. Section 3 outlines India' s trade policy reforms 
undertaken  during  the  1990s.  The  next  section  describes  the  empirical  strategy 
followed in this analysis while section 4 presents the empirical results. This paper 
draws on data from three large-scale employment surveys conducted in 1983, 1993-
1994 and 1999-2000. The two-stage methodology of Krueger and Summers (1988) is 
employed to filter out the effects due to observable worker characteristics from the 
inter-industry wage premia in wage regression models after controlling for potential 
selection bias. Next, the role of trade policy in determining these estimated wage 
premia is assessed. The empirical analysis reported in this paper is restricted to prime-   
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aged adult males engaged in regular wage or salaried employment. Section 6 offers 
some conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2. Trade and wages 
 
The  role  of  trade  liberalisation  in  determining  inter-industry  wage  premia  can  be 
analysed  along  two  lines:  a  shock  to  the  demand  for  labour  and  a  change  in  the 
product market structure.  
 
In the first scenario trade liberalisation is viewed as a shock to industry demand. The 
product  price  changes  accompanying  trade  liberalisation  result  in  changes  to  the 
composition of output and hence, in the bundle of factors used in production. This 
will result in changes in wages, if labour supply is fixed, and in employment, if labour 
supply is flexible. The link from trade liberalisation to relative wages has usually been 
explored  within  the  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  (HOS)  framework.  This  model 
predicts that tariff reductions leading to a fall in the relative price of a commodity will 
reduce  the  real  returns  to  the  factor  used  intensively  in  the  production  of  that 
commodity  and  increase  the  real  return  to  the  other  factor  unambiguously.  Most 
empirical research has focussed on analysing the impact of trade reform on this single 
economy-wide  return  to  labour  (see  for  example  Katz  and  Murphy  (1992)  and 
Robbins (1996)).  
 
The  HOS  model  is  essentially  a  long-run  phenomenon  that  assumes  perfectly 
competitive  and  integrated  markets  and  complete  factor  mobility.  In  the  short-run 
these conditions are unlikely to hold. Empirical evidence suggests that workers do not 
compete in a single labour market and wages received by apparently similar workers 
differ across different industries and that this difference arises out of the worker’s 
industry affiliation even after controlling for ability and other worker characteristics 
(Krueger  and  Summers,  1988).  Though  inter-industry  wage  premia  arising  due  to 
worker heterogeneity, compensating differentials and temporary industry demand or 
supply shocks are consistent with the HOS framework there is considerable evidence 
of non-competitive explanations for the existence of inter-industry wage premia that 
are not consistent with this model. Some of these efficiency wage explanations are 
incorporated into the empirical model discussed in Section 5.2.     
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The medium-run Ricardo-Viner (RV) model of trade allows imperfect factor mobility 
with one factor mobile across sectors while the other is taken to be sector-specific. 
Following a fall in the price of a good due to trade liberalisation the factor specific to 
the sector that experienced the price reduction loses while the other specific factor 
gains in real terms. The impact on the real returns to the mobile factor is ambiguous - 
the real returns fall in the expanding sector and rise in the contracting sector so that 
the  net  effect  depends  on  consumers’  preferences  for  the  two  goods.  If  there  are 
barriers  to  labour  mobility  across  sectors  then  this  model  predicts  a  positive 
relationship between protection and industry wage premia – the fall in trade barriers 
in a sector will adversely affect the relative wage earned by the workers in that sector.  
 
In the second case, trade liberalisation influences the product market structure. The 
relaxation of trade barriers induces a pro-competitive effect. In the presence of scale 
economies  the  number  of  firms  in  an  industry  are  limited  and  there  is  imperfect 
competition.  By  creating  a  larger  market  that  is  capable  of  supporting  a  greater 
number  of  firms  trade  liberalisation  increases  market  competition  and  reduces  the 
distortionary  effects  of  imperfect  competition.  In  the  presence  of  imperfect 
competition and unionisation wages are functions of the firm’s product market rents 
and the worker’s reservation wage and the share of the rents appropriated by workers 
depends on their bargaining power. Those industries with relatively low labour share 
and greater market power (i.e., those that are more concentrated, face barriers to entry, 
make  higher  than  average  profits)  tend  to  pay  higher  wages  (Jean  and  Nicoletti, 
2002). These industry rents are eroded with trade liberalisation. Rodrik (1997) argues 
that trade increases the own price elasticity of labour demand in absolute terms and 
thus erodes the bargaining power of labour vis-à-vis capital in the sharing of industry 
rents.
2 Hasan et al. (2003) find that the elasticity of demand for labour in India is 
positively related to trade protection in the period 1980 to 1997.  
 
Trade  reform  also  impacts  firm  productivity  though  theoretically  the  direction  is 
ambiguous. If there is a positive impact and these enhancements in productivity are 
                                                 
2 By increasing the availability of raw, intermediate and finished goods trade raises the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and other factors of production as well as the elasticity of demand for the 
finished good. The first impacts the demand for labour through the substitution effect while the second 
through the Hicks-Marshallian laws of factor demand (Hasan et al., 2003).     
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passed  on  to  wages  within  industries  then  the  link  between  wages  and  trade 
liberalisation would also be positive (Attanasio et al., 2004). Despite some ambiguity 
(Epifani,  2003)  there  is  some  evidence  from  recent  studies  spanning  the  period 
covering the 1970s to 1990s that the trade-productivity link in Indian manufacturing is 
positive (Das, 2002).  
 
One of the earliest attempt to link trade and wage premia was undertaken by Gaston 
and  Trefler  (1994)  for  US  manufacturing  industries  in  1983.  Though  Gaston  and 
Trefler  found  a  negative  correlation  between  tariff  protection  and  industry  wage 
premia a number of subsequent studies using data from OECD countries (including 
the  US)  (Jean  and  Nicoletti,  2002),  Brazil  (Arbache  et  al.,  2004)  and  Colombia 
(Attanasio  et  al.,  2004)  estimate  a  positive  tariff-wage  effect  after  controlling  for 
industry  specific  effects.  Thus,  despite  some  ambiguity  the  empirical  relationship 
between trade liberalisation and relative industry wages seems to be mostly positive. 
In the Indian context this is among the first attempts to estimate inter-industry wage 
premia and quantify the role of trade in determining these premia. To the author’s 
knowledge,  Dutt  (2003)  is  the  only  other  study  that  estimates  the  effect  of  trade 
protection  on  average  industry  wages  in  India.  There  are,  however,  significant 
differences between Dutt and the current  study relating to variable definition, sample 
coverage  and  methodology  (see  Section  5.2  below).  In  particular,  combining 
employment survey data with industry data allows this paper to go beyond Dutt’s 
analysis that examined the impact on average industry wages, which may exaggerate 
the wage effects of trade protection. 
 
3. Trade liberalisation and the Indian labour market  
 
The  key  elements  of  India' s  pre-reform  development  model  were  rapid 
industrialisation with the prioritisation of capital goods over consumer goods, state 
control  and  regulation  over  the  economy  and  inward-orientation.  The  early  1990s 
witnessed a rapid liberalisation of the trade and industrial policy regime (see Nouroz 
(2001) and Kapila (2001)  for a detailed review). The external sector reforms covered 
the liberalisation of foreign exchange controls and foreign direct investment. The peak 
and average tariff rates fell during the 1990s, as did the dispersion between different    
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tariff  lines  (see  Table  1).  The  numerous  general,  end-use,  specific  user  and 
preferential area exemptions applicable to tariffs were also reduced (Nouroz, 2001). 
Non-tariff barriers, on all goods other than on agricultural and consumer goods, were 
also decreased substantially (Pandey, 1998). 
 
Table 1: Evolution of tariff and industrial policy 

























a  135    355  150  110  85  65  50  52  45  40  39 
Dispersion 
b  30    41      30      19  15  15  14 
Average tariff (unweighted):  98    125  105  95  71  55  41  39  35  40  40 
Agriculture  73    113      43    27  26  26  30  29 
Mining  57    100      70    30  26  25  29  27 
Manufacturing  103    126      73    42  40  36  41  40 
Average weighted (g)      87    64  47  33  27  22  20  30  30 
Agricultural goods      70    30  25  17  15         
Capital goods      97    76  49  38  30         
Intermediate goods      117    55  42  31  24         
Consumer goods      164    144  94  48  39         
ERP 
c    112    116  81  69  47  35  30  28  31   
No. of tariff lines under 
quantitative restrictions
 c        4000 
(80%)        < 
1000         
NTB coverage ratio 
d    95            66    64  62  24 
Agriculture    100            78    80  79  60 
Mining    99            30    27  27  27 
Manufacturing    90            48    39  36  26 
Industrial policy:                         
Items under license   All    27  18    18            6 
Items under public 
reservation  17      8    6            4 
Source: Pandey (1998), Srinivasan (2001) and author’s calculations from Kohli et al. (1983).  
Notes:  These  tariff  rates  include  all  ad  valorem  auxiliary  and  special  customs  duties  and  customs 
surcharges where applicable. a\ In some cases higher than the peak tariff rate is applied to some luxury 
items (e.g., 0.4% of tariff lines in 1997-98, 123% tariff on beverages in 1999-2000). b\ Measured by 
the standard deviation of the unweighted tariffs. c\ Based on the 6-digit Harmonised System code. d\ 
The effective rate of protection (ERP) is defined as the percentage excess of domestic value added 
introduced because of tariff and other trade barriers. e\ This is the percentage of commodities within a 
category that are affected by any form of a non-tariff barrier (NTB). 
 
The tariff data for the three years corresponding to the employment surveys - 1983-
84,  1993-94  and  1999-2000  –  are  simple  averages  net  of  exemptions  that  are 
quantifiable and applicable to all goods within a tariff line (see the data appendix for 
details). The data reveal that the structure of protection across industries has changed 
somewhat over time  – a Kruskal-Wallis test of whether the tariff in the three years 
are from the same population is decisively rejected by the data (
2
2 c  statistic = 67.19). 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient for tariff rates for manufacturing industries    
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is 0.552 between 1983 and 1993, 0.678 between 1993 and 1999 and 0.465 between 
1983 and 1999. This is much lower than that intertemporal correlation in the U.S. 
tariffs of 0.98 between 1972 and 1988. Whereas Hasan and Chen (2003) find a high 
correlation  of  0.91  between  tariffs  in  the  Philippines  between  1988  and  1998, 
Attanasio et al.(2004) find that Colombian tariffs are only loosely correlated over time 
(the  correlations  between  tariffs  in  1984  and  1992,  spanning  the  period  of  trade 
reform, is 0.54). Non-tariff barriers also fell during this period - the change in tariffs 
and  NTBs  have  a  positive  correlation  coefficient  of  0.193  for  manufacturing 
industries (0.130 for all tradable industries) for the two years (1993 and 1999) where 
there are somewhat comparable data.
3  
 
Industrial policy reforms were initiated in the mid-1980s with respect to licensing, the 
role of public sector enterprises, large firms and foreign direct investment (Kapila, 
2001). The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, required the owner of 
any industrial undertaking to obtain a license from the government in order to start 
production, produce a new product, expand existing capacity or enter a new market. 
This  Act  also  defined  state-dominated  industries  including  industries  where  items 
were reserved for public sector production. Systematic deregulation began in earnest 
in  the  mid-1980s  but  by  1989  27  items  were  still  subject  to  licensing.  Further 
deregulation in the 1990s brought this down to 18 items in 1993 and finally to only 6 
in  1999.  The  number  of  items  reserved  for  the  public  sector  alone  (termed  the 
Schedule A industries) was also reduced from seventeen in 1983 to six in 1993 and 
finally to four in 1999 (Misra and Puri, 2001; Sandesara, 1992).  
 
The  reforms  also  encouraged  the  inflow  of  foreign  capital  by  allowing  automatic 
approval (up till 51% or even more) in selected areas, laying down rules for approval 
in other cases and simplifying and expediting the procedure. By 1999, except for a 
small  ‘negative  list’,  all  investment  projects  were  to  be  given  automatic  approval 
(Misra and Puri, 2001). Thus, firms operating in the Indian market in the early 1980s 
faced barriers to entry due to government control over private investment through the 
licensing regulations, reservation of production for the public sector and lengthy and 
opaque procedures for approving foreign direct investment that was further subject to 
                                                 
3 This variable has not been included in the subsequent regression analysis as comparable data on non-
tariff barriers for all three years is not available (NTB data obtained from  Pandey (1998)).     
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a maximum limit of 40% of equity. In addition there are barriers to exit due to labour 
market regulations - the Industrial Disputes Act prevents closure of units and lay-off 
of workers without prior government approval.  Though these restrictions on entry 
were gradually eased from 1985 onwards those on exit were not brought under the 
liberalisation agenda until 2001 (Kalirajan, 2001).  
 
The reforms triggered strong GDP growth of about 6.4% per annum during 1992-
2000 accompanied by strong export growth averaging 14% per annum between 1992 
and 1997 but decelerating to about 4% thereafter. Imports fell steeply till 1992 due to 
the imposition of strict controls to stabilise the economy but grew rapidly thereafter at 
about 15% per annum in the first phase and then decelerating along with exports to 
about  7%  per  annum.  The  trade  to  GDP  ratio  has  risen  gradually  from  14.8%  to 
20.6% between 1990 and 1999 (Ministry of Finance, various years).  
 
This  considerable  structural  change  over  the  space  of  a  decade  is  likely  to  have 
significant implications for the structure of the labour market. The bulk of the adult 
male labour force in India is self-employed – about 58-60% of the labour force in 
rural and 35-39% in urban areas. This paper focuses on the labour market outcomes of 
regular  wage  workers  comprising  about  25%  of  the  labour  force.  Table  2  below 
outlines the trends in employment and real wages of regular workers in the economy 
by one-digit industrial classification.  
 
Table 2: Employment and real wages for regular workers by industry 
  Employment share (%)  Real weekly wages 
a 
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Agriculture and allied sectors  11.10  5.07  5.67  53.24  81.83  125.24 
Mining and quarrying  2.06  2.31  1.75  177.45  241.23  368.59 
Light manufacturing  11.40  10.29  12.30  119.27  144.55  171.48 
Heavy manufacturing  12.87  14.11  13.34  161.37  211.41  238.35 
Utilities  2.22  2.39  2.31  180.16  259.47  431.95 
Construction  1.74  1.66  1.83  138.04  189.55  227.55 
Trade and hotels  7.73  8.65  12.34  89.45  110.50  169.94 
Transport, storage and communication  11.59  10.78  11.73  150.22  191.16  249.84 
Services  39.29  44.74  38.73  170.09  246.85  366.14 
Economy   100  100  100  141.48  204.38  272.67 
Source: National Sample Survey employment surveys, 1983, 1993-94, 1999-2000. a\ Nominal wages 
have been deflated to constant 1983 prices by the official consumer price indices. See data appendix. 
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4. Empirical strategy  
 
Following  the  standard  labour  economics  literature  wage  regression  models  are 
estimated as augmented Mincerian earnings equations controlling for human capital, 
industry  affiliation  and  various  other  characteristics.  Before  the  wage  regression 
models  are  estimated  the  issue  of  potential  selection  bias  is  addressed  using  the 
generalised  framework  popularised  by  Lee  (1983).
4  Selection  is  modelled  as  a 
polychotomous  choice  between  three  employment  categories  –  non-wage  earners 
(including  non-participants  in  the  labour  market,  self-employed  and  unemployed 
individuals), regular wage workers and casual wage workers. As this bias is mediated 
through  observed  wages  it  is  sufficient  and  computationally  more  convenient  to 
separate employment status into non-wage earners and two different types of wage 
earners. The separation of workers based on the nature of employment is based on the 
notion of a dual economy; there is some evidence that the formal-informal dichotomy 
is better characterised by these employment categories in India (Unni, 2001). 
 
As a result a two-stage model for selection and wage determination is estimated. First, 
a multinomial logit model is estimated where the probability that individual i is in 




































     0 1 = g ; m = 2,3; j = 2,3  (1) 
 
where the vector z comprises a set of exogenous explanatory variables, m and j are 
categorical  variables  signifying  selection  between  the  different  employment 
categories. Exclusion restrictions are required to identify the parameters of the wage 
equations so that a set of variables, such as exogenous household non-labour income, 
                                                 
4 The sample of individuals over which a wage function can be estimated is essentially truncated as 
data  on  wages  as  well  as  industry  affiliation  are  reported  only  for  those  individuals  in  wage 
employment. If the selection of this sub-sample of individuals is random then an ordinary least squares 
procedure provides consistent and unbiased estimates of the coefficients. If this selection of individuals 
into  wage  employment  is  systematic  (i.e.,  the  error  terms  in  the  selection  equation  and  the  wage 
equation  are  correlated  in  some  way)  then  ignoring  the  non-random  nature  of  the  sample  would 
introduce a selectivity bias in the wage regression model’s estimates. 
5 The MNL model is identified only up to an additive vector. As a result one set of parameters g s must 
be selected as the base category (in this paper, outcome one) and set to zero.     
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family  background  and/or  household  structure,  that  influence  employment  status 
between  the  alternative  outcomes  but  not  wage  are  included  as  regressors  in  the 
selection  equation.  The  selection  bias  correction  term,  j l ,  constructed  from  the 









l               j = 2, 3              (2)      
 
where  (.) f  and  (.) F  represent the standard normal density and distribution functions 
respectively and Pj is the probability of being in outcome j (j = 2, 3). 
 
An augmented semi-logarithmic Mincerian specification can then be used to estimate 
consistent and unbiased parameters of the wage equations: 
 
j j j j j j j j d x w u l b d b + - + = ˆ ' '
*           j = 2,3              (3) 
 
where wj is the vector of natural log of real hourly wages that are observed only for 
persons  engaged  in  wage  employment,  the  vectors  xj  and  dj  comprise  exogenous 
explanatory and industry affiliation variables respectively,  j u  the random error terms 
such that  0 ) ; | ( = s j j z x E u . The coefficient on the selection bias correction term is 
given by 
j j j m s r b =
*  where j r  is the coefficient of correlation between the error 
terms in the wage equation and the selection equation. 
 
This  two-step  procedure  controls  for  the  underlying  process  by  which  the  set  of 
observations  actually  observed  are  generated  and  ensures  consistent  and  unbiased 
estimates of the parameters of the wage equations.
6 The sampling distribution for the 
                                                 
6  Other  methods  of  correcting  for  selection  bias  in  polychotomous  outcome  models  have  been 
developed by Hay for the conditional logit (cited in Maddala (1983)) and by Bourguignon, Fournier 
and  Gurgand  (2001)  for  the  multinomial  logit.  Alternatively,  semi-parametric  selection  correction 
methods that relax the assumption concerning the joint distribution of the error terms can be used. The 
Lee  correction  was  chosen  because  of  its  simplicity,  computational  convenience  and  transparent 
interpretation of the selection effect. It should be noted that parameter estimates of the wage equations 
obtained in this study using power series approximations for the selection term following the semi-
parametric approach advocated by Newey (1999) were very similar to those obtained by using the Lee 
correction.     
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estimates can be obtained by using a modification to the  formula suggested in Trost 
and Lee (1984) or by bootstrapping. The latter procedure is adopted here and each of 




The  industry  fixed  effects  estimated  in  the  wage  equation  models  (there  is  no 
constant) are normalised as deviations from a employment-weighted mean differential 
following Krueger and Summers (1988) as follows:  
 
k k k s I d d ˆ ) ' ( ˆ* - =                  k = 1,..K industries    (4) 
 
where 
* ˆ d  is the column vector of industry wage premia, I is an identity matrix and s 





k k k n n s
1
 where 
nk is the share of  regular workers in industry  k. The adjusted variance-covariance 
matrix  ) ˆ (
* d V  is computed as suggested by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997):
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)' )( ˆ ( ) ' ( ) ˆ (
*
k k k k s I V s I V - - = d d              k = 1,..K industries    (5) 
 
The resulting wage premia represent the difference in the wage received by a worker 
in an industry to the average worker across all industries in the economy. The overall 
variability  in  wages  across  industries  can  be  approximated  by  the  average 
employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation of the wage premia. The impact of 
trade  liberalisation  on  the  inter-industry  wage  structure  is  then  examined  using  a 
pooled weighted least squares regression model: 
 
                                                 
7 Though it is conventional to report the bootstrapping as a confidence interval rather than as a point 
estimate of the standard error the latter approach is adopted here as  the sampling  variance of the 
industry fixed effects are required to weight the industry wage premia in the second-stage regression 
models.    
8 Krueger and Summers (1988) suggest using the standard errors of the estimated industry coefficients 
d s (and that of the constant for the omitted industry) from the wage regression. Haisken-DeNew and 
Schmidt  (1997)  demonstrate  that  this  overstates  the  standard  error  and  that  the  degree  of  bias  is 
sensitive  to  the  choice  of  the  omitted  industry.  Also,  the  summary  variable  of  dispersion  -  the 
employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation of the wage premia - is likely to be underestimated 
though this is not as sensitive to the choice of base industry in larger samples.    
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) k k k k k k k k z t x q b q a q q d + ¢ + = '




k d  are the estimated wage premia,  tk tariffs, zk various industry characteristics 
and  k x   the  random  error  term  (time  subscripts  suppressed).  Since  the  dependent 
variable  is  estimated  from  the  wage  equation  the  coefficients  in  the  wage-trade 
regression  models  might  have  large  variances  that  could  possibly  differ  across 
industries depending on the variance of the estimated industry coefficients. As a result 
WLS  estimation  that  assigns  lower  weight  to  industries  with  larger  variance  is 
preferred  -  the  weights  ( k k var 1 = q )  are  the  inverse  of  the  variances  of  the 
estimated wage premia obtained from the wage equations at time t following Haisken-
DeNew and Schmidt (1997). The observations are pooled across the three years so as 
to obtain more efficient estimates.  
 
This paper compiles a unique database for India that combines data from employment 
surveys with industry-level data. The employment surveys were conducted by the 
National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) during January-December 1983, July 
1993–June 1994 and July 1999–June 2000 (referred to as 1983, 1993 and 1999 in this 
paper).
9  The  data  appendix  describes  the  data  used  in  this  paper.  The  sample  is 
restricted  to  prime  age  males  aged  between  15  and  65  engaged  in  regular  wage 
employment.  
 
5. Empirical results: Wage regression models and inter-industry wage premia  
 
The results for the multinomial model for selection into wage employment – regular 
and casual – relative to the base category of non-wage earners are not reported here 
for brevity; the wage regression models for regular workers are reported in Table A1 
of  the  Appendix.  The  explanatory  variables  common  to  both  models  are  worker 
characteristics  such  as  age,  the  highest  level  of  education  completed  and  marital 
status, caste and religious affiliation, and controls for location (settlement type and 
state of residence) and seasonality effects (proxied by the timing of the interview for 
                                                 
9 The employment survey for 1987-88 could not be used as over 76% of observations on rural wages 
for persons participating in wage employment are missing.    
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the survey). As noted earlier, the parameters of the wage equations are identified by 
including in the selection equation variables that capture household structure. These 
include the household size, the number of persons aged more than 65 years in the 
household and three dummy variables for whether the household has one child, two 
children or three or more children aged 0-4 years (the omitted category is not having 
any children aged 0-4 years).
10  
 
The majority of the effects estimated in the selection model are plausible and are 
significant at the 1% level or better. Individuals who are educated, married with a 
large number of children and reside in urban areas are more likely to be in regular 
wage employment. The direction of effect of most of the variables remained stable 
across all three  years with a few exceptions, mostly  for the state effects in 1993, 
possibly due to changes in the base state, West Bengal, over time. A Wald test for the 
validity  of  conflating  the  casual  and  regular  wage  employment  categories  was 
decisively  rejected  by  the  data  for  all  three  years.
11  It  must  be  stressed  that  this 
approach is not an attempt at modelling participation in the labour market but one 
designed to obtain the necessary tools to control for potential selection bias in the 
wage regression models. 
 
The dependent variable for the wage equations is the natural log of real hourly wages. 
The explanatory variables in addition to those in common with the selection equation 
are industry affiliation and selection bias correction terms constructed as described in 
Section 4. The regression models are estimated with all industry dummies but without 
a  constant.  The  estimated  coefficients  are  briefly  discussed  before  examining  the 
inter-industry wage premia. 
 
The explanatory power of the variables in all three years is quite high – explaining 
over half the variation in log wages in each year. The standard error of the estimate 
quantifies the deviation of data points around the regression plane and has increased 
                                                 
10 As the choice of identifying variables is  necessarily ad hoc the MNL  model  was estimated for 
different specifications of identifying variables. The parameter estimates in the wage equations are not 
sensitive to the choice of the identifying variables and the coefficient on the correction term itself was 
not materially different across specifications. On balance, these instruments were also not found to 
strongly influence wages in most specifications in most years.  
11 The
2
40 c statistics are 19087.91, 21281.50 and 22068.91 for the three years respectively.    
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by about 10 percentage points between 1983 and 1999. The explanatory variables 
have the expected effects and the majority are significant at the 1% level or better.  
Selection appears to be a significant determinant of wages - individuals selected into 
regular wage employment are likely to earn higher wages than a person randomly 
selected from the population and this effect has risen substantially in the 1990s from 
zero in 1983 to a significant 13% in the later years. The age-earnings profiles display 
the expected concave shape, indicating a positive relationship between age and real 
hourly wages in accordance with the prediction of human capital theory and previous 
empirical research (Murphy and Welch, 1990).  This profile has clearly shifted up 
during these three years - a Wald test of the coefficients on the age splines rejects the 
null hypothesis of no movement between each pair of years.
12  
 
Marriage has the expected positive effect. Being Muslim or belonging to scheduled 
castes  or  tribes  significantly  decreases  the  wage  received  (relative  to  all  other 
individuals  belonging  to  other  religions  and  castes)  possibly  due  to  the  effects  of 
omitted variables such as discrimination, family background and/or occupation (Das, 
2003; Kingdon, 1998). Residing in rural areas significantly reduces the wage received 
(though  this  disadvantage  declined  significantly  after  1983).  Seasonal  effects 
(interacted  with  settlement  type)  are  jointly  significant  while  the  state  dummy 
variables are almost all significant at the 1% level or better indicating the presence of 
constraints  on  inter-state  mobility  possibly  arising  out  of  geographic,  language  or 
ethnic barriers and/or different institutional arrangements for wage-setting.
13   
 
Contrary to the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory for an unskilled labour 
abundant  country  (though  in  common  with  several  other  studies  in  developing 
countries  (Wood,  1997))  the  estimated  returns  to  education  suggest  that  the  skill 
premium for graduates rose during the 1990s. Possible explanations for this are the 
existence of patterns of trade that increase the relative demand for skill, i.e., skill-
enhancing trade or SET (Robbins, 1996), and/or a structure of trade protection that 
formerly favoured relatively unskilled-labour intensive sectors (Harrison and Hanson, 
                                                 
12 The 
2
5 c  statistics are  94.77 between 1983 and 1993, 24.50 between 1993 and 1999 and 197.35 
between 1983 and 1999. 
13 The joint
2
16 c  statistics are 961.57, 677.86 and 943.77 for the three years respectively.    
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1999). The rising gap between graduate and primary education during the 1990s is 
reflected in the sharp rise in wage inequality during this period – the Gini coefficient 
of real hourly wages rose from 0.39 to 0.43 between 1983 and 1999. 
  
5.1. Inter-industry wage premia 
 
The industry coefficients estimated in the wage regression models are all significant at 
the 1% level or better. These are transformed into deviations from the employment-
weighted mean differential as described in Section 4 and are reported in Table A2 of 
the Appendix. The inter-industry wage premia are large and range from a maximum 
of 37% in the fuels mining sector to a minimum of -50% in the plantation crops sector 
in  1999.  High  wage  sectors  are  services  such  as  banking  and  insurance;  heavy 
manufacturing  such  as  petroleum,  chemicals,  metal,  machinery  and  transport 
industries; mining and fuel extraction; and utilities. Low wage sectors comprise of 
agricultural and allied sectors; light manufacturing such as foodstuffs, beverages and 
tobacco and textiles; wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; and services 
such as legal, business, personal and community services.  
 
High wage sectors tend to have a higher share of skilled workers and a lower share of 
casual  workers  and  for  manufacturing  sectors,  higher  capital-labour  ratios.  These 
results are consistent with the findings of studies on other countries where capital 
and/or skill-intensive industries have higher wage premia (Dickens and Katz, 1987; 
Hasan and Chen, 2003). Empirical studies on inter-industry wage structures in the 
U.S. and OECD countries have found that these are relatively stable over time (see for 
example Krueger and Summers (1988), Zanchi (1995)). For instance, Krueger and 
Summers (1988) find a correlation of 0.91 between 1974 and 1984 wage premia in the 
US. The evidence for developing countries is mixed. While Hasan and Chen (2003) 
find  fairly  high  correlations  of  between  0.81  and  0.84  in  wage  premia  in  the 
Philippines between 1988, 1994 and 1997, Attanasio et al.(2004) find that the year-to-
year correlations of wage premia in Colombia are as low as 0.14.  
 
The Indian wage structure is not as highly correlated over time as the US though more 
so than the Colombian case. There is significant variation in the magnitude of the    
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inter-industry wage premia over time
14 but the Indian inter-industry wage structure 
was relatively stable during the first decade - Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
is 0.909 between 1983 and 1993. Though still fairly high the correlation of industry 
rankings in terms of relative wages during the 1990s was lower - Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient is 0.858 between 1993 and 1999. The rank correlation over the 
entire  two-decade  period,  however,  was  much  lower  at  0.761.
15  A  Kruskal-Wallis 
equality of populations rank test decisively rejects the null hypothesis that the wage 
premia estimated in the three years are from the same population.
16 This suggests that 
the wage structure though initially stable became less so during the 1990s possibly 
due to the industrial and trade policy reforms during this period. This is reflected also 
in the increase in the inter-industry dispersion of wages during the 1990s. The overall 
variability in sectoral wages is summarised using the employment-weighted standard 
deviation of the inter-industry wage premia adjusted for sampling variance. Again, 
this  did  not  change  very  much  during  the  first  decade  and  remained  around  13% 
between 1983 and 1993 but increased substantially to 18% in 1999.
17 This increasing 
dispersion coupled with the previous finding of increasing selection effects indicates a 
rise in the importance of unobservable skill. The extent to which the level of and the 
change in inter-industry wage dispersion can be attributed to the trade liberalisation of 
the 1990s is assessed in the following section. 
 
5.2. Trade liberalisation and the inter-industry wage structure 
 
The subsequent analysis is undertaken for manufacturing industries only as tariffs do 
not adequately capture protection in agricultural and mining industries that are still 
subject to numerous quantitative restrictions (see Table 1). Even as late as 1997-98, 
84% of value added in agriculture was subject to import licensing requirements as 
                                                 
14 A test for whether wage premia estimated in one year were significantly different from those in 
another year was set up as follows:
2












1 t t t t t t d d d d d d - + ¢ -
-  where  * ˆ
t d  is 
a vector of the estimated wage premia in year ti (i=1,2) and var(
* ˆ
t d ) is the variance-covariance matrix 
of these premia (k = 54). The 
2
54 = k c statistics are 1265 for 1983 and 1993, 1975.65 for 1993 and 1999, 
and 1008.85 for 1983 and 1999.  
15 For manufacturing industries the Spearman rank correlation coefficients were 0.877, 0.809 and 0.761 
between these pairs of years. 
16 The 
2
2 c  statistics are 6.201 for all industries and 16.90 for manufacturing industries. 
17 Similarly for manufacturing industries the adjusted employment-weighted standard deviation was 
about 10-11% in the first two years and rose to 14% in 1999.    
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compared with 30% in manufacturing industries (mainly consumer goods) (Cadot et 
al., 2003). This suggests that using tariffs to measure protection for agriculture would 
not  be  appropriate.  Approximately  24-25%  of  regular  workers  are  employed  in 
manufacturing industries (about 6,764 workers in the sample representing 10 million 
workers  in  1999).  The  vast  majority  is  employed  in  non-tradables  such  as  public 
administration and other service industries for which tariff data are not applicable.  
 
Labour reallocation from industries with higher relative tariff reductions to others was 
quite low during this period and inter-industry employment shares changed by less 
than one percentage point between 1983 and 1999 in all but nine industries (of which 
seven changed by about one to three percentage points). A regression of the change in 
employment  shares  and  change  in  tariff  indicates  that  there  is  no  significant 
relationship between the two. This provides some support for the notion that regular 
workers were relatively immobile in response to trade shocks.  
 
In order to examine econometrically the impact of the tariff reductions during the 
1990s on the industry wage structure a pooled weighted least squares (WLS) model is 
estimated. Alternative models are also estimated in order to test the robustness of the 
tariff-wage  effect.  These  include  an  unweighted  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS) 
estimation, specifications including various trade flow measures and an alternative 
measure of tariff, and a differenced model regressing the change in industry wage 
premia to the change in industry tariffs.  
 
A bivariate plot of wage premia and tariffs for the three years - 1983, 1993 and 1999 – 
(see Figure A1 in the Appendix) indicates a positive relationship between these two 
variables though there is some noise in the data. It is also clear from the figure that the 
two observations for industry 12 (the beverages industry) in the first two years have 
exceptionally high tariff rates.
18 The observations for this industry in all three years 
were identified as influential observations in the subsequent regression analysis with 
high leverage values and in some cases high residual values as well. The exclusion of 
these observations had an impact on the estimated coefficient on tariffs. Though some 
                                                 
18 In all three years the beverages industry tariff rate is extremely high – 185%, 205% and 122% 
compared to an average rate of 109%, 81% and 37% in 1983, 1993 and 1999 respectively for the 
remaining 31 manufacturing industries – mainly due to the high tariff on goods with alcohol content. 
This is also one of the few industries where tariffs rose between 1983 and 1993.     
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other observations were identified as possible outliers (e.g., manufacture of tobacco in 
1993) omitting these observations from the dataset did not influence the estimated 
coefficients.  The  specifications  estimated  below  do  not  include  the  beverages 
industry. 
 
In  the  first  specification  wage  premia  are  regressed  on  the  average  industry  tariff 
(expressed in fractional points). Dummy variables for the years 1993 and 1999 are 
included  to  control  for  time-specific  macroeconomic  shocks.  To  the  extent  that 
political  economy  considerations  and  the  ranking  of  tariffs  on  the  basis  of 
unobservable worker characteristics (e.g., protection is higher in industries with lower 
wages  or  with  less  skilled  workers)  are  important  there  is  a  danger  of  spurious 
correlation between tariffs and relative wages. This problem of potential simultaneity 
bias  can  be  mitigated  by  including  additional  industry  characteristics  (Gaston  and 
Trefler, 1994) or estimating differenced models (i.e., regressing the change in wage 
premia on the change in tariffs (Attanasio et al., 2004).
19  
 
The compensatory wage differentials approach argues that wage premia reflect in part 
payments  to  workers  to  compensate  for  non-pecuniary  aspects  of  their  work  that 
directly affect their utility, including the accidental risk of death. The frequency rate 
of fatal injuries reported by establishments in the organised sector
20 is included in the 
second specification to capture this effect.  
 
The third specification includes variables indicating the average level of observable 
human  capital  as  suggested  by  Dickens  and  Katz  (1987).  Though  the  effect  of 
individual  productivity  or  skill  (proxied  by  education)  is  captured  in  the  wage 
regression models it is possible that the average level of skill in an industry also 
influences the average wage in that industry. They also argue that unobserved labour 
                                                 
19  Alternatively,  a  two-stage  least  squares  model  that  simultaneously  determines  tariffs  and  wage 
premia can also be estimated. The difficulty lies in identifying appropriate instruments that determine 
tariffs but not industry wages. Data on instruments suggested by the political economy literature (such 
as measures of producer lobbying and share of intermediate sales in total domestic output as used by 
Cadot  et  al.  (2003))  were  difficult  to  obtain.  Similarly,  instruments  suggested  by  the  evolution  of 
protection  in  India  (such  as  classification  according  to  the  end-use,  i.e.,  capital,  intermediate  and 
consumer  goods (Nouroz, 2001)) proved to be inadequate at the level of aggregation  used in this 
analysis. 
20  The  organised  sector  covers  those  enterprises  registered  under  the  Factory  Act  (1948),  i.e.,  all 
establishments that employ ten or more workers and use power as well as those that employ twenty or 
more workers but do no use power.    
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quality or discrimination might crowd female workers into certain jobs that reduce 
their wages and that this crowding also reduces the wages of any other workers in that 
job.  If  this  were  so  then  the  share  of  women  in  the  industry’s  workforce  would 
influence the average wage in that industry. In this paper the share of skilled and 
female workers in an industry are included in the third specification.
21  
 
The fourth specification includes variables that capture labour market regulation and 
industrial policy. Aghion et al.(2003) find that the impact of trade liberalisation on 
productivity  growth  and  profits  differed  across  states  depending  on  their  labour 
market institutions.
22 In order to capture this regional dimension at the industry-level 
states are classified into three groups – those that have passed pro-worker or pro-
employer  amendments  or  are  neutral  (i.e.,  did  not  experience  any  amendment 
activity). The shares in total industry employment in the first two state groups are 
included  in  the  second  specification.  The  hypothesis  is  that  workers  in  industries 
concentrated in pro-worker states would have greater bargaining power that possibly 
enables them to extract higher wages (or employment guarantees).  
 
Jean and Nicoletti (2002) point out that market structure also plays an important role 
in determining relative wages. Efficiency wage models predict that firms operating in 
less competitive markets and facing a relatively inelastic product demand curve would 
have greater ability to pay workers higher than competitive wages. As a result studies 
of determinants of wage premia usually include variables that capture the degree of 
competition  either  through  industrial  concentration,  barriers  to  entry  or  degree  of 
import penetration. The first of these variables is not included in the analysis in this 
paper  for  three  reasons:  one,  it  is  difficult  to  obtain  comparable  data  on  industry 
concentration ratios for all three years; two, the variables used to capture industrial 
regulation  are  likely  to  be  highly  correlated  with  any  measure  of  industrial 
concentration (see below); and three, industrial regulation measures are preferable as 
they  provide  a  direct  link  to  policy  unlike  measures  of  concentration  or  product 
market rents (Jean and Nicoletti, 2002). Capturing the effect of barriers to entry are 
                                                 
21  These  variables  are  potentially  endogenous;  however,  the  results  indicate  that  the  effect  of  the 
variable of interest, tariff rates, is robust to the inclusion of these variables.   
22 Both central and state governments are empowered to introduce legislation on matters related to 
trade unions as well as industrial and labour disputes implying that firms located in different states 
might face different regulatory climates (Besley and Burgess, 2004).    
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particularly important in the Indian context as the trade reforms in the 1990s were 
preceded  and  accompanied  by  domestic  industrial  deregulation.  The  fourth 
specification includes two dummy variables to capture industrial policy reform with 
respect to licensing and reservation of production for the public sector. The tariff 
variables capture the effect of trade policy on the product market structure. Trade flow 
measures  are  potentially  endogenous  and  are  included  only  in  alternative 
specifications to check the robustness of the tariff coefficient.  
 
The  fifth  specification  includes  other  determinants  of  relative  wages  such  as 
unionisation,
23 average establishment size and capital intensity. This data pertain to 
the  organised  manufacturing  sector.  The  union  threat  model  proposed  by  Dickens 
(1986) argues that firms may pay high wages to avoid the threat of collective action. 
As a result industries where conditions are favourable to unionisation (e.g., larger 
plant sizes), workers are predisposed to form unions and the firms have the ability to 
pay or have higher profits to share would be more likely to have higher wages (Jean 
and Nicoletti, 2002). Most empirical studies have found a positive effect of industry 
union density on the wages of both unionised and non-unionised workers (though this 
is sensitive to the data and methodology used (Dickens and Katz, 1987)). The average 
establishment size has also usually been found to be positively related to the average 
industry wage (Brown and Medoff, 1989).  
 
Efficiency wage models indicate that capital intensity is also likely to be positively 
related  to  worker  bargaining  power  and  wages.  Essentially,  for  industries  with  a 
relatively  high  capital-labour  ratio  the  cost  of  raising  wages  is  lower  (Jean  and 
Nicoletti,  2002).  The  problem  here  is  the  possibility  that  industry-specific  capital 
could  respond  endogenously  to  changes  in  labour  costs  -  it  is  not  possible  to 
determine whether capital intensive industries need to pay higher wages or whether a 
high wage premium arising due to other factors results in the substitution of capital 
for  labour  (Dickens  and  Katz,  1987).  The  capital-labour  ratio  is  also  likely  to  be 
correlated with the regional labour market variables – industries concentrated in pro-
                                                 
23 Studies on the determinants of inter-industry premia often include factors like union membership or 
coverage and establishment size in the first-stage wage regression models and estimate inter-industry 
wage premia after controlling for these factors (see for example Brown and Medoff (1989)). This data 
are not available for all 3 years at the individual level in the Indian survey data (and there are many 
missing values in the years for which the data are available) so average industry data is used in these 
second-stage regression models.     
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worker states may substitute labour for capital. As a result the capital-output ratio 
instead of the capital-labour was included in the fifth specification in order to check 
the robustness of the  results rather than to analyse the role of capital intensity in 
determining relative wages. Though the potential simultaneity bias still exists it is 
likely to be less of a problem.  
 
Table 3 reports the results of these five specifications employed in 31 manufacturing 
industries (excluding the beverages industry that was identified as an outlier). The 
first five regression models are estimated using Weighted Least Squares (WLS) with 
the variance in the estimated wage premia as the weights. As a sensitivity test the last 
specification is also estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (A5’).  
 
Table 3: Determinants of regular wage premia for manufacturing industries 
Dependent variable: estimated inter-industry wage premia
1 
   Weighted least squares (WLS)  OLS  Mean 
   (A1)  (A2)  (A3)  (A4)  (A5)   (A5')    
Trade policy:               
Average tariff  0.1413*  0.1214  0.1382**  0.1580***  0.2072***  0.1135*  0.7128 
  (0.0795)  (0.0792)  (0.0598)  (0.0583)  (0.0512)  (0.0576)  (0.3253) 
Time dummy for 1993  0.0003  -0.0149  -0.0481*  -0.0405  -0.0227  -0.0596*  0.3333 
  (0.0360)  (0.0365)  (0.0269)  (0.0359)  (0.0317)  (0.0340)  (0.4724) 
Time dummy for 1999  -0.0226  -0.0513  -0.0710  -0.0347  -0.0347  -0.1099*  0.3333 
  (0.0621)  (0.0633)  (0.0464)  (0.0533)  (0.0464)  (0.0561)  (0.4724) 
Compensating differentials:               
Frequency rate of fatal injuries    0.5586*  0.2625  0.1497  0.3409  0.6384**  0.0581 
    (0.3031)  (0.2253)  (0.2632)  (0.2431)  (0.3028)  (0.0390) 
Labour quality:               
Share of female workers      -0.2633***  -0.1727*  -0.2363***  -0.1674  0.0887 
      (0.0821)  (0.0906)  (0.0844)  (0.1019)  (0.1205) 
Share of skilled workers      0.3690***  0.4007***  0.4359***  0.4524***  0.4176 
      (0.0567)  (0.0554)  (0.0488)  (0.0511)  (0.1870) 
Labour and industrial policy:               
Pro-worker states        0.2621***  0.0832  -0.0033  0.4337 
        (0.0798)  (0.0865)  (0.0909)  (0.1635) 
Anti-worker states        0.0981  0.1378  0.0447  0.3643 
        (0.1059)  (0.1007)  (0.1037)  (0.1471) 
Industrial license dummy        0.0078  -0.0054  -0.0058  0.4839 
        (0.0324)  (0.0288)  (0.0285)  (0.5024) 
Public sector dummy        0.0331  0.0269  0.0326*  0.1290 
        (0.0233)  (0.0212)  (0.0178)  (0.3371) 
Organised sector variables:               
Union density          0.0602  0.0663  0.1863 
          (0.0401)  (0.0421)  (0.1574) 
Average establishment size          0.0003***  0.0003***  91.69    
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          (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (112.23) 
Capital-output ratio          0.0738***  0.0893***  0.3608 
          (0.0278)  (0.0327)  (0.2415) 
               
Constant  -0.1277  -0.1288  -0.2154***  -0.4163***  -0.4773***  -0.3451***  
  (0.0842)  (0.0831)  (0.0686)  (0.1048)  (0.0956)  (0.1013)   
Number of observations  93  93  93  93  93  93  93 
R-squared  0.1151  0.1536  0.5809  0.5942  0.6931  0.7172    
Note: The weights in the weighted least squares models are the variance in the estimated wage premia. 
The beverages industry has been excluded from the dataset. 1\. Wage premia and tariffs are expressed 
as fractional points. Mean wage premia for the sample is –0.018. 2\. As the reported R
2 does not 
provide a useful measure of goodness of fit of the original (unweighted) model the unadjusted R
2 for 
the WLS models is computed as the squared correlation between the actual and predicted values of the 
dependent  value  (where  the  predicted  value  is  computed  using  the  unweighted  data  and  efficient 
parameter estimates from the WLS regression model) (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
 
While the first specification explains only about 12% of the variation in the industry 




The  tariff-wage  effect  is  consistently  positive  and  significant  at  the  10%  level  or 
better across all except the second specification (where is it is significant only at the 
13% level), indicating that industries with relatively higher protection would tend to 
have relatively higher wages. The estimated coefficient is more precisely defined in 
the  last  two  specifications  as  additional  industry  covariates  are  included  and  is 
significant at the 1% level or better. The last specification using the WLS regression 
model (A5) reports a 0.21 tariff-wage elasticity. For instance, moving a worker from 
an  industry  with  the  average  level  of  protection  in  1983  (103%  tariff  rate)  to  an 
industry  with  zero  tariff  the  estimates  in  the  last  specification  (A5)  implies  a 
substantial fall of about 21% (= 0.2072* 1.03 * 100) in the wage premium. The OLS 
estimate of the tariff-wage elasticity reported in specification (A5’) is also positive 
though somewhat smaller in magnitude at 0.11. 
 
As the predictions of trade theory are predicated in terms of the impact of the change 
in protection on the change in relative wages a differenced model that explains the 
changes in industry wage premia is also estimated. The explanatory variables are the 
changes  in  trade  and  industrial  policy  -  the  change  in  tariff  rates,  delicensing  for 
industries and de-reservation of production for the public sector. Industry dummies    
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for  groups  of  similar  industries  are  included  to  control  for  heterogeneous  effects. 
Individual industry dummies could not be used due to the small sample size. The 
results  from  the  unweighted  differenced  models  estimated  using  Ordinary  Least 
Squares  (with  standard  errors  corrected  for  heteroscedasticity  using  the  White 
correction) are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. These differenced models also 
find a positive and, once the industry group dummy variables are included, significant 
relationship between the change in tariffs and the change in wages - industries with 
larger  tariff  reductions  tend  to  have  larger  reductions  in  wages.  The  tariff-wage 
elasticity is 0.18 which is similar to that obtained by Attanasio et al. (2004) in their 
first differences model for Colombia (0.14).  
 
In a recent study on India Dutt (2003) estimates a pooled OLS model with tariffs, 
capital  formation,  industry  dummy  variables  and  a  dummy  for  pre-  and  post-
liberalisation period (post 1993) as determinants of log wages for 1990, 1992 and 
1997.  In  contrast  to  the  research  reported  in  the  current  study,  no  significant 
relationship between tariffs and real wages is detected. As noted earlier, however, 
there  are  differences  between  the  two  studies  with  respect  to  variable  definition, 
sample coverage and methodology. The wage variable is constructed by dividing the 
industry annual wage bill by the number of employees. The wage variable in this 
paper is the wage rate actually reported by workers as accruing to them during the 
week  preceding  the  survey.  The  sample  covers  all  workers  in  the  organised 
manufacturing sector only whereas this paper examines workers with regular wage 
employment.  Most  importantly,  the  average  industry  wage  does  not  account  for 
differences in individual human capital and other characteristics. This research and all 
the  other  studies  reported  here  use  industry  wage  premia,  obtained  from  wage 
regression  models,  as  the  dependent  variable.  These  represent  wage  differentials 
arising solely out of the worker’s industry affiliation.  
 
Gaston and Trefler (1994) found a significant negative effect of tariffs on relative 
wages  in  US  manufacturing  industries  in  1983  that  is  robust  to  the  inclusion  of 
industry  specific  effects  and  to  the  treatment  of  tariff  as  endogenous.
24  Possible 
                                                 
24 Their regression model also includes various other trade-related variables such as non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs), exports, imports, import growth over the previous three years and intra-industry trade. Though    
  24
explanations  for  this  negative  correlation,  supported  by  the  data,  include  the 
possibility that unions take advantage of protection by offering wage concessions in 
exchange  for  employment  guarantees.  Another  possible  reason  is  that  efficient 
reallocation of labour from import-competing sectors has been discouraged by long-
term protection and the negative tariff-wage effect simply reflects this inefficiency 
(Gaston  and  Trefler,  1994).  Using  data  from  Mexico,  Feliciano  (2001)  finds  an 
insignificant  tariff  effect  (the  reductions  in  industry  wage  premia  in  reformed 
industries were found to be driven by lowering of import license coverage), as do 
Hasan and Chen (2003) for the Philippines. 
 
Attanasio et al. (2004), on the other hand, estimate a positive correlation between 
tariff protection and industry wage premia after controlling for unobserved sectoral 
heterogeneity and political economy factors through industry specific effects.
25 They 
regress changes in wages on changes in tariff and estimate that a 10% reduction in 
tariff would decrease relative wages by 1.4%. This is similar to the estimated tariff 
effect reported in Table 3 above. This positive tariff-wage relationship was found to 
be robust to the inclusion of trade flow and other industry-specific variables (such as 
sectoral capital) and also to instrumenting for trade policy changes. Estimation of 
inter-industry wage premia across 12 OECD countries including the U.S. using panel 
data for 1996 reveals a strong positive impact of tariff (and non-tariff) barriers on 
relative wages in manufacturing industries (Jean and Nicoletti, 2002).
26 Arbache et al. 
(2004) match industry tariff data to individual survey data in Brazil between 1987 and 
1998 and estimate that reducing the effective tariff applicable to an industry by 10 
percentage  points  would  reduce  industry  wages  by  about  1.6%  (evaluated  at  the 
median  tariff)  in  Brazil  between  1987  and  1998.  On  the  whole  it  seems  that  the 
direction of the effect of trade policy on the wage outcome as captured by average 
tariff rates is largely positive for manufacturing industries.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
NTBs are found to be associated with higher wages this effect is not statistically significant in most 
specifications.  
25 They estimate a negative tariff-wage effect in manufacturing industries when there are no controls 
for industry specific effects.  
26  This  specification  includes  other  trade  variables  such  as  NTBs,  import  penetration  and  export 
intensity, industry-specific variables such as union density and establishment size as well as industry 
and country dummies.     
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This positive relationship between tariff protection and relative wages is consistent 
with the Ricardo-Viner trade model under the assumption that regular wage labour is 
immobile across industries. This model postulates that by reducing competition from 
imports protection raises the demand for labour, which in turn raises the wages in that 
industry as labour reallocation across industries is constrained and does not eliminate 
the differential. The existence of labour market rigidities seems relevant in the Indian 
context where employment security is of paramount importance for workers (Ghose, 
1995). Data from the 1999 NSS survey reveal that there is practically no mobility of 
workers across industries - only about 1% of all workers and 1.2% of male regular 
workers had changed industries in the two years preceding the survey.
27 Presumably 
workers  with  regular  jobs  build  up  firm-  and  industry-specific  capital  or  acquire 
seniority status that makes their response to labour demand shocks less elastic. This 
positive tariff effect is also consistent with the notion that trade reduces distortions in 
an  imperfectly  competitive  market  thereby  eroding  rents  and  leading  to  a  fall  in 
relative wages.  
 
Other industry characteristics 
The time dummies are not significant at a conventional level in the majority of the 
specifications indicating that time-variant and industry-invariant factors do not play a 
significant role in determining wage premia. There is some evidence in support of 
compensating wage differentials – the wage-fatality elasticity is 0.03 (evaluated at the 
mean). This is lower than previous estimates for the organised manufacturing sector 
in India (ranging widely from 0.06 to 0.6) primarily because these studies pertain to 
workers in the organised manufacturing sector only while the analysis in this paper 
encompasses on regular workers in both the organised and unorganised manufacturing 
sectors. There are also differences in the definition of job risks and the treatment of 
risk preferences, econometric specification and errors of measurement arising chiefly 
from assigning industry-level injury data to individual-level data. 
 
The  effects  of  female  and  skilled  workers  are  as  expected  –  the  former  exert  a 
significant downward pressure on industry wages while the latter have a significant 
                                                 
27 The level of disaggregation of industry affiliation is not reported in the survey. This question was not 
asked  in  the  previous  two  surveys.  However  a  crude  approximation  for  migrant  workers  in  1983 
revealed that about 3% of these migrants had changed their industry over the past two years preceding 
the survey.    
  26
positive effect (elasticities are 0.2-0.3 and 0.4 respectively). Dickens and Katz (1987) 
also estimate the same direction of effects for the U.S.
28 The experience of several 
Asian countries has been that deregulation and liberalisation has generated increased 
demand for female labour, particularly in light manufacturing industries and export-
oriented industries, as  women are often willing to accept lower wages, temporary 
contracts and inferior working conditions and have lower unionisation rates (Kanji 
and Menon-Sen, 2001).
29 The positive skill intensity effect suggests that either more 
able workers are attracted to industries paying higher wages or workers in industries 
where  other  workers  are  well  educated  or  more  experienced  may  also  be  better 
workers. In the latter case productivity would be higher in an industry with a greater 
proportion  of  skilled  workers,  over  and  above  the  marginal  product  of  labour  (as 
captured by the effect of education on the individual wage in the wage regression 
models).  
 
There is some evidence that industries with a large share of employment concentrated 
in  states  with  pro-worker  labour  legislation  (relative  to  the  employment  share  in 
neutral states) pay higher wages. The industrial license and public dummy variables 
are included to capture the effects of industrial policy on relative wages through their 
effect  on  the  production  function  as  well  as  the  market  structure.  The  latter  also 
reflected preferential government treatment to key sectors according to India' s state-
led  development  plan.
30  Both  policies  restricted  competition  and  generated  rents 
implying a positive relationship between these dummy variables and industry wage 
premia. The license dummy has an insignificant effect on the average wage premia, 
possibly  due  to  the  lack  of  inter-industry  variation  in  1983  as  all  manufacturing 
industries  had  to  obtain  licenses  for  entry  and  expansion.  The  reservation  of  an 
industry for production by the public sector has the expected positive effect on the 
industry wage premia but is poorly determined. 
                                                 
28 These regression models were also estimated with alternative definitions of the share of female and 
skilled workers – the proportion of these workers in total wage employment and in the total labour 
force in the industry. The estimated effects, especially of the key variables of interest, using these 
alternative definitions of worker composition and labour market policy were similar to those reported 
in the text. 
29 Case studies of the knitwear industry (Neetha, 2002) and the engineering industry (Vanamala, 2001) 
confirms this pattern in India.  
30 It should be noted that this variable is not the same as a variable capturing public sector wage premia 
accruing  to  workers  employed  in  public  sector  enterprises.  A  dummy  variable  for  public  sector 
affiliation could not be included in the wage regression models due to lack of comparable data in the 
surveys.     
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Estimates of the union wage gap for developing countries are few and range from 2-
4%  in  the  Republic  of  Korea  (Kim,  1993)  to  15-20%  in  Malaysia  both  in  1988 
(Standing,  1992).  The  estimates  in  Table  3  indicate  that  union  density  exerts  no 
independent effect on relative industry wages. This is possibly a consequence of using 
average industry level data (in the absence of individual data),
31 under-reporting of 
the true extent of unionisation,
32 and the possibility that employment security is of 
greater importance to Indian workers than wages (Ghose, 1995). Trade unionism in 
India is characterised by the multiplicity of unions, often with external leadership, 
with no provision for the procedure of union recognition for collective bargaining. As 
a  result  “the  trade  union  movement  remained  weak  and  fragmented”  (Tendulkar, 
2003, pp. 8). Nagaraj (1994, pp. 180) claims that “in a period [1980s] of declining 
bargaining power of organised workers and structural changes in employment within 
registered sector towards smaller sized establishments, unionised labour is unlikely to 
have secured a disproportionate increase in the wage rate”.  
 
The elasticity of the industry wage premia with respect to the establishment size is 
about  0.03  (evaluated  at  the  mean).  This  is  smaller  than  the  estimates  of  the 
establishment size-wage effect for the U.S. surveyed in Brown and Medoff (1989) – 
these range from 0.8 to 3.8. The average establishment size in India is quite small – 
about 92 employees per factory in the organised sector. This could be a consequence 
of excess entry due to protection or because firms prefer small sizes due to the labour 
market regulations.
33 The capital-output ratio has a significantly positive effect on 
wages though this variable is potentially endogenous.   
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
 
                                                 
31 Teal (1996) estimates a significant elasticity ranging from 0.21 to 0.25 using individual-level data for 
Ghana in the early 1990s – this falls to 0.07 when firm-level data are used and is no longer a significant 
determinant of wages. 
32 Not all unions are legally required to submit annual statutory returns and many state governments do 
not publish data on registered trade unions. Only about 18% of registered unions submitted returns that 
are reported in the trade union data in 1983. This fell further to 12% by 1993 (Bhattacherjee, 1999). 
33 The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure under the central Industrial Disputes Act (amended in 
1982) apply to establishments with 100 or more workers but some state governments have amended 
this to apply to 50 or more workers (Besley and Burgess, 2004).     
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The sensitivity of the tariff-wage effect estimated above to alternative measures of 
tariff and the inclusion of trade variables to account for various channels, other than 
tariffs, through which trade policy impacts wages is tested.  
 
Some researchers prefer to use a measure of the published tariff that does not take into 
account any exemptions (Pandey, 1998) while others use a measure that takes into 
account exemptions that apply to entire tariff lines (Nouroz, 2001).
34 The former is 
preferable if the exemptions on tariffs are included in profits so that domestic prices 
reflect the full tariff; the latter if these exemptions are incorporated in the domestic 
prices. The latter measure for average tariff is used in the regression models above. 
The regression models reported in Table 3 are re-estimated using this alternative tariff 
measure. Table A4 in the Appendix reports the results for the preferred specification 
(A5). The tariff-wage effect is still significantly positive though the elasticity (0.1) is 
lower than that estimated above.  
 
The  regression  models  reported  above  capture  trade  policy  by  means  of  average 
tariffs.  In  the  presence  of  informal  trade  barriers,  non-tariff  barriers,  differential 
transport and communications costs, and other industry-specific barriers that affect 
trade flows outcome variables such as industry import and export values or shares will 
capture the overall effect of all trade-related channels, other than through tariffs, on 
wages.  The  sensitivity  of  the  estimated  tariff  coefficient  reported  in  Table  3  was 
assessed with respect to the inclusion of trade variables as additional regressors.  
 
Trade  data  for  the  31  manufacturing  industries  were  compiled  from  two  different 
sources – official publications of the Indian government and the World Bank Trade 
and  Production  or  WBTP  database  (Nicita  and  Olarreaga,  2001).  There  are 
differences  in  the  trade  data  in  the  two  sources  possibly  arising  due  to  different 
concordances  between  the  trade  and  industrial  sector  codes  and  coverage.
35  The 
Indian  data  refer  to  the  financial  year,  as  do  the  organised  sector  data  on  union 
density, average establishment size and capital-output ratio above, while the WBTP 
                                                 
34 There remain other exemptions that it is not possible to take into account, such as exemptions on 
certain items within tariff lines, end-use and country-of-origin exemptions. 
35  The  concordance  between  the  ISIC  production  codes  and  trade  codes  used  by  the  World Bank 
database is not documented. The concordance between industry and trade codes used in this paper are 
available on request.     
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database refers to the calendar year. The discrepancy is wide – the average value of 
imports (in constant 1983 prices) for the 31 industries in the sample is Rs. 11,151 
million using the Indian data and Rs. 10,454 million using the WBTP data. The two 
sources are closer for exports – Rs. 9,845 million and Rs. 9,760 million respectively 
but significant differences in the values and shares across industries remain.  
 
Gaston and Trefler (1994) include contemporaneous import and export flows (in logs) 
in their regression models and find significant negative and positive effect of imports 
and exports respectively on industry wages. Jean and Nicoletti (2002) also include 
contemporaneous measures of trade flows – import penetration and export intensity. 
They  find  a  significant  negative  effect  of  the  former  on  relative  industry  wages. 
However trade measures for the same year could be potentially endogenous with the 
wage premia as the former depend on factor costs. Attanasio et al. (2004) counter this 
by  including  lagged  import  and  export  values  but  find  no  significant  relationship 
between lagged import and export flows and industry wages. This research includes, 
separately, contemporaneous real import and export flows in constant 1983 prices, 
import and export shares (from both data sources) and nominal import and export 
flows  lagged  one  and  two  years  (from  the  WBTP  database  only)  in  all  five 
specifications.  Table  A3  in  the  Appendix  reports  the  results  for  the  preferred 
specification (A5).  
 
The  trade  variables  have  largely  the  expected  effect  on  wage  premia  in  the 
(unreported) regression models corresponding to specifications (A1)-(A3) in Table 3, 
i.e., when controls for labour and industrial policy and other industry characteristics 
are  not  included.  The  effect  of  the  import  variables  (contemporaneous  or  lagged 
import flows or import share) on the industry wage is largely positive while that of the 
export variables is negative (though rarely significant). These effects are consistent 
with the notion of comparative advantage. Countries tend to export goods that use 
intensively the relatively abundant factor; in India this is unskilled low-wage labour. 
The pattern of trade indicates that industries with high import flows or shares were in 
general intermediate and capital goods industries, such as the base metal industry,    
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electrical and non-electrical machinery, petroleum products, chemicals etc.
36 Many of 
these industries were identified as critical sectors for the Indian economy and had 
some sub-sectors reserved for public sector production. It is unlikely that India would 
have a comparative advantage in the production of these goods.  
 
As these trade variables are potentially endogenous since they depend on factor costs 
they are treated merely as conditioning variables to test the robustness of the tariff 
coefficient. The coefficient on tariffs is robust to the inclusion of these trade variables 
(from either of the two data sources) and the tariff coefficient varies in a tight range of 
-0.01 and +0.04 around the values reported in Table 3. The estimated coefficients for 
other  variables,  such  as  the  share  of  female  and  skilled  workers  and  the  average 




This research represents one of the first attempts at analysing econometrically the link 
between trade protection and inter-industry wage premia (after controlling for worker 
characteristics) in India. The analysis combines detailed tariff and other industry-level 
data with microeconomic survey data for three years - 1983, 1993 and 1999 - that 
span the period of rapid trade and industrial liberalisation in the 1990s. This paper 
finds  that  the  impact  of  trade  protection  on  the  inter-industry  wage  premia  is 
substantial - more protected industries tend to pay higher relative wages to workers 
with regular wage employment. Conversely, industries that undergo tariff reductions 
have lower wages relative to other industries. This positive tariff-wage effect is robust 
to the inclusion of industry specific effects, such as fatality rate, worker composition, 
regional concentration, industrial policy, other industry characteristics and trade flow 
measures. This positive effect could reflect the erosion of rents that are received (and 
are reflected in the wages earned) by unionised workers in imperfectly competitive 
markets following trade liberalisation.  It is also consistent with the Ricardo-Viner 
models of trade that predict a positive relationship between tariffs and inter-industry 
wage  premia.  Thus,  this  paper  adds  to  the  growing  literature  on  the  positive 
relationship between trade protection and industry wages.  
                                                 
36 An exception is the edible oils industry which has high imports but these were ‘canalised’ until 1995, 
i.e., all imports were channelised through state agencies.    
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These results also suggest that India' s trade reforms during the 1990s had implications 
for wage inequality. The wage regression models indicate that the skill premium for 
graduates rose during this period. In addition, the data suggest that industries with 
high initial levels of tariff protection (i.e., in 1983) had low wages relative to the 
economy average and a high share of unskilled workers. These industries were also 
those  that  experienced  the  greatest  reductions  in  tariff  protection.  As  a  result  the 
positive tariff-wage effect implies that the trade reforms are likely to have exacerbated 
overall wage inequality as the relative wages of workers (predominantly unskilled) in 
these  manufacturing  industries  fell.  Unskilled  workers  were  hit  by  the  rising  skill 
premium as well as an additional decline in their relative wages as the industries in 
which they were predominantly employed experienced a decline in wage premiums 
relative to skill-intensive industries. This is reflected in the rise in the Gini coefficient 
of real hourly wages from 0.396 in 1983 to 0.439 in 1999. At least some of this rise in 
inequality is likely to be due to trade liberalisation during the 1990s. A Fields’ (2002) 
decomposition of the wage regression functions reveals that the industry affiliation of 
workers explains about one-fourth of the wage inequality in each of the three years. 
To the extent that the level of and change in trade protection affects the industry wage 
premia it is also likely to affect wage inequality.  
 
Low  mobility,  due  to  the  lack  of  transferable  skills  or  other  barriers,  between 
industries  prevents  workers  from  moving  out  of  industries  with  declining  relative 
wages in response to trade reform. This suggests the need to increase labour market 
flexibility  and  for  safety-net  programmes  for  workers  affected  by  trade  so  as  to 
minimise short-run adjustment costs faced by trade-displaced workers. The National 
Renewal Fund (NRF), that aims to re-train and re-deploy workers accepting voluntary 




The three large-scale employment surveys for January-December 1983, July 1993–June 1994 and July 
1999–June 2000 (referred to as 1983, 1993 and 1999 in the paper) provide data on employment, wages 
and individual characteristics. Individuals were divided into three mutually exclusive categories using 
current weekly status: (i) non-wage earners, i.e., non-participants in the labour market, self-employed and 
unemployed individuals (ii) regular wage employment and (iii) casual wage employment.  
 
Wage data 
The distribution of nominal weekly wages was trimmed by 0.1% at the top and bottom tails. This is 
necessarily an ad hoc measure: some researchers prefer to trim the wage distribution using specific 
values (Krueger and Summers, 1988) while others prefer to trim the distribution at the tails (Arbache et 
al., 2004) as adopted here. These nominal wages were deflated to 1983 prices using official state-level 
monthly consumer price indices (base year 1960-61) for agricultural labourers (CPIAL) for rural wages 
and industrial workers (CPIIW) for urban wages (Labour Bureau, various years). Using the survey data 
on the intensity of work for each day of the week and assuming a 48 hour week, the number of hours 
worked and the real hourly wage was constructed.  
 
Variables influencing wages 
Following Murphy & Welch (1990) age splines at ten-year intervals are included as a proxy for labour 
force experience. Marital status is a dummy variable coded one if currently married and zero if never 
married,  widowed,  divorced  or  separated.  There  is  information  on  the  highest  level  of  schooling 
completed (but not on the number of years of schooling) so dummy variables corresponding to the 
following education variables were constructed: primary school, middle school, secondary school and 
graduate and above. The reference category is individuals who are illiterate or have less than two years 
of formal or informal schooling. Dummy variables for caste and religious affiliation were constructed 
from household data; the omitted category is all other households. Seasonality effects are captured by 
dummy variables for the quarter in which the households were interviewed. These quarterly dummies 
were  also  interacted  with  the  dummy  variable  for  the  rural  sector.  Workers  are  classified  into  54 
industries based on their current weekly industrial classification.  
  
Tariff and trade data 
Simple averages of tariffs for 1983-84, 1993-94 and 1999-2000 (Jain, various years; Kohli et al., 1983) 
are constructed from the basic customs tariff for all three years as well as the auxiliary tariff in 1983-84 
(merged with the basic tariff in 1993-94) and the surcharge on basic customs tariff in 1999-2000. The 
majority are ad valorem rates; the few specific and composite rates could not be quantified and have 
not been included. In the case of composite rates, the ad valorem rate is included. The additional duty 
is not included because it is a countervailing duty for excise duties on domestic production (Pandey, 
1998). Those exemptions that are quantifiable and are applicable to all goods within a tariff line are 
taken into account. A concordance table was constructed between the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature 
(BTN) used in the 1983 tariff schedule and the Harmonised System (HS) used in the other two years.    
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The tariff data were then mapped into 54 industries (Central Statistical Organisation, 1990). Trade flow 
variables for 1983 and 1993 were constructed from the input-output tables for these two years (Central 
Statistical Organisation, various years-a). In the absence of a more recent input-output table than 1993-
94, trade data for 1999 were constructed from data on imports and exports values at the 6-digit HS 
level (DGCIS, various years). In cases where a particular HS line was common to two industries 8-digit 
HS codes and textual descriptions were used to assign the trade value to one of the industries. 
 
Industrial and labour market policy 
Two dummy  variables are constructed to capture the incidence of industrial policy.  The industrial 
license dummy is coded one for industries that have to obtain a license for any aspect of economic 
activity and zero otherwise. The public sector dummy is coded one if the industry is reserved for the 
public sector and zero otherwise. States are classified into three groups – those that have passed pro-
worker or pro-employer amendments or are neutral (i.e., did not experience any amendment activity) - 
and the share of employment in total industry employment in these state groups are included in order to 
capture  a  regional  dimension  at  the  industry  level.  Group  one  comprises  the  pro-worker  states  of 
Gujarat, Maharastra, Orissa and West Bengal; group two comprises the pro-employer states of Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; and group three comprises 
neutral states of Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. The Besley and Burgess (2004) 
dataset includes Jammu and Kashmir (neutral) but not Himachal Pradesh and Tripura. The mode of the 
labour regulation variable is six. The two omitted states are classified as neutral in the absence of 
information regarding labour law amendments. 
 
Other industry-specific variables 
Variables controlling for industry characteristics such as  the share of female, casual  and unskilled 
(defined  as  those  with  less  than  secondary  education)  workers  in  the  industry  labour  force  are 
constructed  from  the  NSS  survey  data.  Data  on  other  industry-specific  variables  such  as  labour 
productivity,  average  establishment  size  and  union  density  are  available  only  for  the  organised 
manufacturing  sector  and  are  obtained  from  the  Annual  Survey  of  Industries  (Central  Statistical 
Organisation, various years-b) and other secondary sources. The fixed capital stock in each industry is 
deflated  to  constant  1983  prices  by  the  wholesale  price  index  (WPI)  for  machinery,  transport 
equipment and construction materials (i.e., products of the non-metallic minerals industry) (Office of 
the Economic Advisor, various years). Labour is measured as the total number of employees in each 
industry. The average establishment size is computed as the number of employees per factory. Union 
density  is  constructed  from  data  on  the  membership  of  trade  unions  deflated  by  the  number  of 
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Table A1: Wage regression models, 1983-1999 
   1983  1993  1999 
Age spline: 15-25 years 
  0.0131***  0.0102***  0.0144*** 
  (0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0022) 
Age spline: 25-35 years   0.0174***  0.0162***  0.0200*** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0013)  (0.0012) 
Age spline: 35-45 years   0.0110***  0.0157***  0.0157*** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0010)  (0.0011) 
Age spline: 45-55 years   0.0055***  0.0133***  0.0165*** 
  (0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0013) 
Age spline: 55-65 years   -0.0286***  -0.0305***  -0.0260*** 
  (0.0032)  (0.0048)  (0.0046) 
Married  0.0656***  0.0766***  0.0861*** 
  (0.0073)  (0.0094)  (0.0102) 
Member of scheduled caste or tribe  -0.0450***  -0.0365***  -0.0309*** 
  (0.0057)  (0.0076)  (0.0075) 
Muslim  -0.0134*  -0.0309***  -0.0363*** 
  (0.0072)  (0.0091)  (0.0092) 
Completed primary school  0.0665***  0.0428***  0.0505*** 
  (0.0072)  (0.0099)  (0.0116) 
Completed middle school  0.1376***  0.0944***  0.1115*** 
  (0.0079)  (0.0122)  (0.0118) 
Completed secondary school  0.3493***  0.2636***  0.2990*** 
  (0.0106)  (0.0162)  (0.0143) 
Completed graduate school  0.6101***  0.5307***  0.6083*** 
  (0.0145)  (0.0229)  (0.0192) 
Residence in rural areas  -0.1360***  0.0128  -0.0174 
  (0.0135)  (0.0201)  (0.0172) 
Selectivity bias correction term  -0.0253  -0.1099***  -0.1082*** 
  (0.0166)  (0.0266)  (0.0231) 
Number of observations  27,335  26,130  27,284 
R
2  0.5521  0.4812  0.534 
Standard error of estimate  0.3467  0.4157  0.4466 
Note:  *statistically  significant  at  the  .10  level;  **at  the  .05  level;  ***at  the  .01  level.  Standard  errors  in 
parentheses (obtained after bootstrapping with 1000 replications). The estimated coefficients on the age splines 
are not cumulative. 54 industry, 16 state and six seasonality (with interactions with settlement type) dummy 
variables are also included (the estimated coefficients for the industry dummies reported in Table A2).  
 
Table A2: Inter-industry wage premia, 1983-1999 
  Wage equation coefficients  Wage premia 
   1983  1993  1999  1983  1993  1999 
Agricultural and allied activities:           
Food crops  0.4520***  0.6989***  0.8341***  -0.2198***  -0.2533***  -0.2096*** 
  (0.0571)  (0.0911)  (0.0832)  (0.0079)  (0.0131)  (0.0154) 
Cash crops  0.4239***  0.6192***  0.7168***  -0.2479***  -0.3330***  -0.3269*** 
  (0.0654)  (0.1036)  (0.1047)  (0.0318)  (0.0522)  (0.0653) 
Plantation crops  0.4725***  0.5988***  0.5362***  -0.1993***  -0.3534***  -0.5074*** 
  (0.0588)  (0.0933)  (0.0838)  (0.0132)  (0.0237)  (0.0197) 
Other crops  0.5960***  0.8302***  0.7639***  -0.0758  -0.1221*  -0.2798*** 
  (0.0926)  (0.1131)  (0.1028)  (0.0697)  (0.0699)  (0.0662) 
Animal husbandry  0.3921***  0.7240***  0.7694***  -0.2797***  -0.2283***  -0.2743*** 
  (0.0598)  (0.0948)  (0.0900)  (0.0230)  (0.0370)  (0.0454)  
  37
Forestry and fishing  0.5567***  0.9351***  1.1135***  -0.1151***  -0.0171  0.0698* 
  (0.0704)  (0.0961)  (0.0907)  (0.0413)  (0.0413)  (0.0421) 
Mining sector:             
Fuels  1.0301***  1.2559***  1.4174***  0.3583***  0.3036***  0.3737*** 
  (0.0586)  (0.0893)  (0.0831)  (0.0161)  (0.0217)  (0.0175) 
Minerals  0.7839***  0.9823***  0.9708***  0.1121***  0.0300  -0.0729 
  (0.0638)  (0.0973)  (0.0959)  (0.0297)  (0.0387)  (0.0497) 
Manufacture of :             
Sugar products  0.7594***  0.9757***  0.9537***  0.0876***  0.0235  -0.0900** 
  (0.0671)  (0.0959)  (0.0884)  (0.0338)  (0.0359)  (0.0375) 
Edible oils  0.5386***  0.7840***  0.8086***  -0.1332***  -0.1682***  -0.2351*** 
  (0.0678)  (0.0991)  (0.1048)  (0.0386)  (0.0422)  (0.0651) 
Miscellaneous food products  0.5815***  0.8210***  0.9223***  -0.0903***  -0.1313***  -0.1214*** 
  (0.0590)  (0.0920)  (0.0831)  (0.0199)  (0.0210)  (0.0215) 
Beverages  0.6722***  0.9502***  0.9720***  0.0005  -0.0020  -0.0717 
  (0.0691)  (0.1144)  (0.1024)  (0.0395)  (0.0656)  (0.0635) 
Tobacco  0.4385***  0.5499***  0.9111***  -0.2333***  -0.4024***  -0.1326** 
  (0.0611)  (0.0976)  (0.0999)  (0.0226)  (0.0411)  (0.0616) 
Cotton textiles  0.7078***  0.8164***  0.8878***  0.0360***  -0.1358***  -0.1559*** 
  (0.0572)  (0.0906)  (0.0827)  (0.0114)  (0.0144)  (0.0197) 
Woollen and silk textiles  0.6673***  0.9654***  0.9086***  -0.0044  0.0131  -0.1351*** 
  (0.0598)  (0.0923)  (0.0873)  (0.0227)  (0.0199)  (0.0321) 
Jute textiles  0.7621***  1.0271***  0.9293***  0.0903***  0.0748***  -0.1144*** 
  (0.0577)  (0.0891)  (0.0868)  (0.0187)  (0.0171)  (0.0353) 
Misc. textile products  0.6274***  0.8297***  0.8980***  -0.0444**  -0.1226***  -0.1456*** 
  (0.0574)  (0.0896)  (0.0833)  (0.0173)  (0.0208)  (0.0199) 
Wood products  0.5991***  0.8695***  0.8459***  -0.0727***  -0.0827**  -0.1978*** 
  (0.0601)  (0.0934)  (0.0889)  (0.0222)  (0.0336)  (0.0373) 
Paper products  0.7817***  1.0072***  0.9600***  0.1099***  0.0549  -0.0837** 
  (0.0677)  (0.0960)  (0.0888)  (0.0383)  (0.0372)  (0.0349) 
Printing and publishing  0.5540***  0.7737***  0.8304***  -0.1178***  -0.1785***  -0.2133*** 
  (0.0605)  (0.0946)  (0.0811)  (0.0218)  (0.0287)  (0.0158) 
Leather and leather products  0.6767***  0.8867***  0.9119***  0.0049  -0.0656**  -0.1318*** 
  (0.0686)  (0.0949)  (0.0878)  (0.0402)  (0.0326)  (0.0303) 
Rubber products  0.7688***  0.9779***  1.0448***  0.0970  0.0256  0.0012 
  (0.0743)  (0.1045)  (0.0914)  (0.0510)  (0.0535)  (0.0422) 
Plastic products  0.6250***  0.8499***  0.8648***  -0.0468  -0.1024***  -0.1789*** 
  (0.0769)  (0.0935)  (0.0879)  (0.0526)  (0.0317)  (0.0330) 
Petroleum products  0.8578***  1.1433***  1.3004***  0.1860***  0.1910***  0.2567*** 
  (0.0881)  (0.1057)  (0.0952)  (0.0675)  (0.0615)  (0.0527) 
Heavy chemicals  0.7378***  0.9763***  1.0179***  0.0660*  0.0240  -0.0258 
  (0.0666)  (0.0955)  (0.0981)  (0.0362)  (0.0352)  (0.0572) 
Fertilisers and pesticides  0.8983***  1.2790***  1.2095***  0.2265***  0.3268***  0.1658*** 
  (0.0790)  (0.1038)  (0.0915)  (0.0536)  (0.0539)  (0.0404) 
Paints, varnishes and lacquers  0.8314***  0.9635***  0.9130***  0.1596***  0.0112  -0.1306*** 
  (0.0802)  (0.1116)  (0.0969)  (0.0571)  (0.0627)  (0.0502) 
Drugs and medicines  0.8380***  1.0403***  1.0416***  0.1662***  0.0880**  -0.0021 
  (0.0732)  (0.0998)  (0.0898)  (0.0439)  (0.0428)  (0.0389) 
Soaps, cosmetics and glycerine  0.7234***  0.9373***  0.9188***  0.0516  -0.0149  -0.1249* 
  (0.0772)  (0.1027)  (0.1033)  (0.0510)  (0.0508)  (0.0649) 
Miscellaneous chemicals  0.8023***  1.0218***  1.0086***  0.1305***  0.0695***  -0.0351 
  (0.0686)  (0.0993)  (0.0950)  (0.0389)  (0.0393)  (0.0502) 
Non-metallic mineral products  0.6489***  0.9817***  0.9570***  -0.0228  0.0294  -0.0867*** 
  (0.0594)  (0.0921)  (0.0857)  (0.0184)  (0.0266)  (0.0273) 
Basic metal industry  0.8467***  1.0748***  1.1860***  0.1749***  0.1226***  0.1423*** 
  (0.0586)  (0.0907)  (0.0846)  (0.0160)  (0.0204)  (0.0240) 
Metal products  0.6371***  0.8198***  0.8756***  -0.0347  -0.1325***  -0.1681***  
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  (0.0592)  (0.0920)  (0.0833)  (0.0227)  (0.0224)  (0.0188) 
Machinery for agriculture and food 
& textile industries  0.7040***  0.9924***  0.8943***  0.0322  0.0401  -0.1494** 
  (0.0695)  (0.1004)  (0.1032)  (0.0450)  (0.0444)  (0.0714) 
Other non-electrical machinery  0.7548***  1.0200***  1.1339***  0.0830***  0.0678***  0.0902*** 
  (0.0604)  (0.0925)  (0.0848)  (0.0236)  (0.0226)  (0.0262) 
Electrical industrial machinery  0.9205***  1.0988***  1.0720***  0.2487***  0.1466***  0.0283 
  (0.0636)  (0.0992)  (0.0854)  (0.0273)  (0.0407)  (0.0295) 
Electrical appliances and electronics  0.7460***  0.9962***  0.9540***  0.0742***  0.0440  -0.0897*** 
  (0.0632)  (0.0938)  (0.0860)  (0.0283)  (0.0287)  (0.0281) 
Sea, rail and motor transport 
equipment  0.7472***  0.9935***  0.8994***  0.0754***  0.0412*  -0.1443*** 
  (0.0591)  (0.0908)  (0.0822)  (0.0189)  (0.0239)  (0.0206) 
Other transport equipment  0.5207***  0.8724***  0.7995***  -0.1511***  -0.0799**  -0.2442*** 
  (0.0658)  (0.0972)  (0.0893)  (0.0323)  (0.0398)  (0.0392) 
Misc. manufacturing industry  0.6401***  0.9482***  0.9280***  -0.0317  -0.0041  -0.1157*** 
  (0.0594)  (0.0916)  (0.0838)  (0.0226)  (0.0189)  (0.0215) 
Utilities:             
Electricity  0.8548***  1.1685***  1.3900***  0.1830***  0.2163***  0.3463*** 
  (0.0578)  (0.0921)  (0.0831)  (0.0145)  (0.0179)  (0.0198) 
Gas & water supply  0.7255***  1.0361***  1.3337***  0.0537  0.0839**  0.2900*** 
  (0.0673)  (0.1009)  (0.0906)  (0.0352)  (0.0412)  (0.0387) 
Construction  0.6919***  0.9289***  1.0403***  0.0201  -0.0233  -0.0034 
  (0.0583)  (0.0913)  (0.0846)  (0.0165)  (0.0213)  (0.0203) 
Trade, hotels and restaurants:             
Wholesale and retail trade  0.4659***  0.6989***  0.8261***  -0.2059***  -0.2533***  -0.2176*** 
  (0.0575)  (0.0897)  (0.0807)  (0.0083)  (0.0088)  (0.0086) 
Hotels and restaurants  0.5272***  0.8430***  0.9043***  -0.1446***  -0.1093***  -0.1394*** 
  (0.0582)  (0.0901)  (0.0815)  (0.0156)  (0.0182)  (0.0175) 
Transport, storage and communication:           
Railway transport services  0.7758***  1.0983***  1.3176***  0.1040***  0.1461***  0.2740*** 
  (0.0565)  (0.0904)  (0.0818)  (0.0086)  (0.0119)  (0.0135) 
Other transport services and storage  0.7336***  0.9745***  1.0097***  0.0618***  0.0223**  -0.0340*** 
  (0.0571)  (0.0906)  (0.0812)  (0.0087)  (0.0106)  (0.0092) 
Communication  0.6216***  0.9534***  1.0755***  -0.0502***  0.0012  0.0318 
  (0.0588)  (0.0936)  (0.0847)  (0.0180)  (0.0245)  (0.0212) 
Services:             
Banking  0.8816***  1.1700***  1.3055***  0.2098***  0.2178***  0.2618*** 
  (0.0587)  (0.0916)  (0.0816)  (0.0141)  (0.0159)  (0.0162) 
Insurance  0.9482***  1.2003***  1.2692***  0.2764***  0.2481***  0.2255*** 
  (0.0707)  (0.0973)  (0.0897)  (0.0407)  (0.0387)  (0.0396) 
Education and research  0.7227***  1.0030***  1.1343***  0.0509***  0.0507***  0.0907*** 
  (0.0575)  (0.0900)  (0.0821)  (0.0077)  (0.0090)  (0.0104) 
Medical and health services  0.6845***  0.9992***  1.1741***  0.0127  0.0470**  0.1304*** 
  (0.0581)  (0.0933)  (0.0830)  (0.0153)  (0.0199)  (0.0200) 
Other services 
1  0.4910***  0.7480***  0.8375***  -0.1808***  -0.2042***  -0.2062*** 
  (0.0574)  (0.0904)  (0.0826)  (0.0111)  (0.0114)  (0.0161) 
Public administration  0.7195***  1.0142***  1.2175***  0.0477***  0.0619***  0.1738*** 
  (0.0566)  (0.0901)  (0.0811)  (0.0043)  (0.0053)  (0.0057) 
             
Employment-weighted mean 
standard deviation 
2        0.1338  0.1413  0.1844 
Sample size   27,356  26,387  27,295          
Notes:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses 
computed using the procedure suggested by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997).  
1\ Other services comprises legal, business, personal, social, sanitary and community services.   
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2\ This is a summary measure of the overall variability in wages across industries computed using the procedure 
suggested by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997).  
 
Table A3: Determinants of wage premia for manufacturing industries: Differenced model 
Dependent variable: Change in the estimated inter-industry wage premia 
 
   (A1)  (A2)  (A3)  Mean 
1 
Change in tariff  0.0884  0.1049  0.1816**  -0.3518 
  (0.0726)  (0.0715)  (0.0868)   
Time dummy for 1993  0.0211  0.0030  -0.0139  0.3333 
  (0.0203)  (0.0232)  (0.0220)   
Delicensing 
2    0.0245  0.0310  0.4355 
    (0.0207)  (0.0199)   
Public sector de-reservation 
2    0.0218  0.0435  0.0968 
    (0.0224)  (0.0318)   
Textiles      -0.0592  0.1290 
      (0.0585)   
Wood, paper and leather      -0.0555  0.1290 
      (0.0565)   
Rubber, plastic and petroleum     0.0138  0.0968 
      (0.0565)   
Chemicals      -0.0630  0.1935 
      (0.0575)   
Mineral and metal products      -0.0136  0.0968 
      (0.0557)   
Machinery and transport      -0.0774  0.1935 
      (0.0636)   
Miscellaneous manufacturing      -0.0334  0.0323 
      (0.0686)   
Constant  -0.0389  -0.0368  0.0368   
  (0.0347)  (0.0340)  (0.0776)   
Observations  62  62  62   
R
2  0.0672  0.0899  0.2251    
Note: The beverages industry has been excluded from the dataset. All models are estimated using unweighted 
Ordinary Least Squares with Huber-White corrected standard errors.  
1\ The mean of the dependent variable is -0.0594 and of the omitted industry dummy (food products) is 0.1290. 
2\ These variables are coded as 0 if no change and 1 if there is a change between two years – all change implies a 
removal of licensing and reservations.  
 
Table A4: Weighted Least Squares estimation of industry wage premia using alternative 
tariff and trade measures 
Dependent variable: estimated inter-industry wage premia
1 




(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  One year  Two years 
Average tariff 
1  0.1032**  0.1997***  0.2007***  0.2122***  0.2095***  0.1987***  0.1933*** 
  (0.0467)  (0.0512)  (0.0518)  (0.0502)  (0.0512)  (0.0525)  (0.0509) 
Import measure 
2    0.0013  -0.0007  0.3137*  0.2496  -0.0004  -0.0071 
    (0.0032)  (0.0044)  (0.1810)  (0.1979)  (0.0017)  (0.0050) 
Export measure 
2    0.0080  0.0057  0.0873  0.0277  0.0055  0.0123* 
    (0.0056)  (0.0055)  (0.1522)  (0.1321)  (0.0054)  (0.0062) 
Time dummy for 1993  -0.0393  -0.0418  -0.0377  -0.0300  -0.0286  -0.0358  -0.0523 
  (0.0343)  (0.0337)  (0.0349)  (0.0319)  (0.0326)  (0.0420)  (0.0356) 
Time dummy for 1999  -0.0767  -0.0658  -0.0562  -0.0411  -0.0410  -0.0566  -0.0759 
  (0.0520)  (0.0499)  (0.0513)  (0.0468)  (0.0478)  (0.0580)  (0.0533)  
  40
Frequency rate of fatal injuries  0.2946  0.3194  0.3303  0.1947  0.1691  0.3240  0.4016 
  (0.2606)  (0.2429)  (0.2498)  (0.2521)  (0.2759)  (0.2457)  (0.2464) 
Share of female workers  -0.2285**  -0.2073**  -0.2298**  -0.2302*** -0.2217**  -0.2356*** -0.2624*** 
  (0.0904)  (0.0865)  (0.0878)  (0.0833)  (0.0858)  (0.0869)  (0.0867) 
Share of skilled workers  0.4177***  0.4402***  0.4482***  0.4258***  0.4300***  0.4449***  0.4870*** 
  (0.0518)  (0.0498)  (0.0527)  (0.0520)  (0.0523)  (0.0501)  (0.0550) 
Pro-worker states  0.0521  0.0739  0.0810  0.1030  0.0815  0.0817  0.0720 
  (0.0917)  (0.0898)  (0.0877)  (0.0854)  (0.0866)  (0.0870)  (0.0855) 
Anti-worker states  0.0670  0.1373  0.1303  0.1836*  0.1506  0.1276  0.1119 
  (0.1050)  (0.1014)  (0.1015)  (0.1021)  (0.1021)  (0.1021)  (0.1002) 
Industrial license dummy  0.0147  -0.0105  -0.0085  -0.0174  -0.0133  -0.0070  -0.0110 
  (0.0304)  (0.0289)  (0.0291)  (0.0291)  (0.0297)  (0.0295)  (0.0285) 
Public sector dummy  0.0283  0.0231  0.0255  0.0123  0.0152  0.0244  0.0331 
  (0.0227)  (0.0216)  (0.0226)  (0.0222)  (0.0229)  (0.0216)  (0.0227) 
Union density  0.0605  0.0541  0.0489  0.0539  0.0498  0.0533  0.0240 
  (0.0428)  (0.0426)  (0.0429)  (0.0395)  (0.0408)  (0.0419)  (0.0433) 
Average establishment size  0.0003***  0.0003***  0.0003***  0.0003***  0.0003***  0.0003***  0.0003*** 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Capital-output ratio  0.0672**  0.0901***  0.0906***  0.0828***  0.0831***  0.0871***  0.1158*** 
  (0.0296)  (0.0309)  (0.0325)  (0.0293)  (0.0307)  (0.0310)  (0.0340) 
Constant  -0.3504*** -0.6631*** -0.5740*** -0.5023*** -0.4763*** -0.5777*** -0.5771*** 
  (0.0983)  (0.1469)  (0.1444)  (0.0961)  (0.0968)  (0.1414)  (0.1544) 
Observations  93  93  93  93  93  93  93 
R-squared  0.6940  0.6986  0.6922  0.6953  0.6922  0.6933  0.6902 
Note: The weights in the weighted least squares models are the variance in the estimated wage premia (i.e. 
,
K K var 1 = q  where vark is the estimated variance of industry k). The beverages industry has been excluded 
from the dataset. The unadjusted R
2 for the WLS models is computed as the squared correlation between the 
actual and predicted values of the dependent value.  
Specification (1) uses trade measures computed using data from official Indian government publications while 
specification (2) uses data from the World Bank Trade and Production database.  
1\ This refers to the average tariff without allowing for any exemptions in Col. 1 and to average tariff as defined 
in the rest of the paper, i.e., allowing for exemptions that apply to entire tariff lines, in the rest of the table (col. 
2-7). 2\ These  measures are defined as  follows – the natural log of import and export values expressed in 
constant 1983 prices (col. 2 and 3); the import and export share (col. 4 and 5) and the natural log of export and 
import values (in nominal terms) lagged one and two years (col. 6 and 7. respectively).  The average of these 
additional  explanatory  variables  are  as  follows:  average  published  tariff  (0.7787);  Indian  sources:  log  real 
imports (21.3460), log real exports (21.8781), import share (0.0323) and export share (0.0322); World Bank 
Trade and Production database: log real imports (21.3461), log real exports (21.6436), import share (0.0321), 
export share (0.0322), log imports lagged one year (17.903) and log exports lagged one year (22.090). 
 





























































































































Note: The numbers represent the industry code: 12 is the beverages industry (see Table A2 for details).  